of character states occurred, cladistics was given its best chance to trace ''descent with modification.'' By giving most models higher forward-transition probabilities than backtransition probabilities (and none the reverse), evidence of relationship, once evolved, was unlikely to be lost, offering conditions under which cladistics should work well. Thus, transition probabilities spanned a range between too few changes to resolve cladistic relationships at all and too many changes to avoid overwriting cladistically informative changes during subsequent evolution. If the real world does not resemble such evolutionary models, cladists are in more trouble than they realize! Another of Smith's concerns is that because lineage segments are used as terminal taxa, ''no taxon overlaps with any other, thereby prohibiting any sampling error that might reverse the order of occurrence of two taxa'' (Smith, 2000, p. 765) . This quote profoundly misrepresents . Their branching model let lineages persist or go extinct, give rise to new lineages or not, and change or not in any of 50 morphologic characters. Complete, seven-(or more) lineage histories included 18-61 (mean, 38.0) ingroup lineage segments spanning a collective duration of 7-25 time units (mean, 15.0) . Every simulation included temporally overlapping lineage segments. Simulation of incomplete preservation randomly removed segments from complete histories, leaving ''fossil records'' containing only a fraction of the original number of lineage segments. With incomplete preservation, there was no guarantee that the earliest recovered representatives of lineages would occur in the same temporal order as true lineage originations.
With lineage segments as units of analysis, Smith also worries that ''stratigraphic debt intervals then exactly match taxon durations so that when a taxon is sampled its complete range is sampled'' (Smith, 2000, p. 765) . Everyone knows, he implicitly reminds us, that taxon ranges are sampled incompletely by the fossil record, so if a model suggests otherwise, it must be ''very specific and unrealistic.'' However, Smith's interpretation conflates two different meanings of the word ''taxa'': taxa as units of descent, and taxa as units of phylogenetic analysis. Units of descent, whether ancestor-descendant sequences or clades, clearly have some longevity, but when units of descent become units of phylogenetic analysis, conventional cladistics ignores their longevity (for purposes of the analysis itself). However, units of phylogenetic analysis may also include representatives of single, specieslevel populations, effectively sampled at a point in time. Such samples each derive from some unit of descent with a finite longevity, but that longevity is usually unknown. When stratocladistics uses lineage segments as units of analysis, these are likewise treated as if they were point-samples with respect to the temporal dimension. Of course, they come from some finite interval of time, but we make no claim about how long or short this is; we make no claim about any ordering of events within time units, because time units have been chosen to reflect that level of temporal resolution below which we cannot reliably order all relevant events. This view admits that the stratigraphic record is not a continuous, infinitely divisible, time axis. A stratocladistic analysis of lineage segments is thus no more ''specific and unrealistic'' than a cladistic analysis of exemplars drawn from a set of species or higher taxonomic groups. For the study, it is trivially correct that if a given unit of analysis (lineage segment) was sampled at all, it was sampled ''completely,'' but it does not follow that relevant units of descent were sampled completely. After OTU-loss, a lineage that originally spanned N successive time intervals could be preserved in anywhere from zero to N intervals. Moreover, discrete coding of time intervals is formally equivalent to postulating missing time at every intervalboundary . Thus, stratocladistics' working assumption is not that all units of descent are sampled completely, but rather that no unit of descent is sampled completely. This is not problematic because durations of lineage segments are not at issue, only their order of appearance in the fossil record.
Smith faults recent attempts to quantify the completeness of the fossil record, asserting (p. 765), ''They pointedly fail to address how representative that fossil record is of what once existed.'' Yet one of Foote and Sepkoski's measures of completeness, the proportion of living families with a fossil record (groups range from about 0.2 to 0.9 and above), is immune to this criticism because no temporal or spatial metric is involved. A family is either preserved or not, and consequently contributes either to completeness or incompleteness, respectively. Values vary with taxonomic level, but basing the measure on our relatively complete knowledge of the Recent makes it highly relevant to ''what once existed.' ' Foote and Sepkoski's (1999) other measure of completeness, the probability of genus preservation per stratigraphic interval (groups range mainly from about 0.1 to 0.7, for interval lengths of ca. 5.5 m.y.), may be more relevant because it closely resembles the measure of completeness used by . Although different in detail, percent of lineage segments preserved also expresses the frequency of lineage preservation relative to the number of intervals through which they persist. For a taxon to be counted as ''complete'' in an interval, in real examples of the kind being modeled, it only has to occur once-not continuously throughout the interval, just once-somewhere. Completeness measured in this way may be high, even when probability of individual preservation is low. This usage of ''completeness'' should be familiar. When we say a stratigraphic sequence is ''complete'' at a certain level of resolution (Sadler, 1981) , we do not require that all time within such an interval be represented-only that there be some sediment representative of a given scale of time interval. Time intervals of constant length are required for quantifying a parameter relative to absolute time, but stratocladistics' variable-length time intervals suffice for data on temporal order.
Smith may still worry that focused on the ''wrong'' range of preservation probabilities, but this assumes that there is a threshold of preservation probabilities below which incorporation of stratigraphic data is more often misleading than helpful. If such a threshold exists, Fox et al. did not find it. Rather, even as the record deteriorated, the cladistic topology of hypotheses selected by stratocladistics usually remained closer to the actual topology linking the recovered taxa than were the topologies selected by cladistics. The performance of both methods declined with decreasing preservation probability-no method does consistently better with less information than with more-but stratocladistics' use of data on temporal order, in addition to the same morphologic data seen by cladistics, let it keep its edge. To be sure, random taxon sampling introduced some noise into this pattern. Just as some taxa have morphologic character state combinations that lead their presence or absence to affect the outcome of an analysis more than other taxa (Gauthier et al., 1988) , some have temporal data that make them pivotal from a stratocladistic viewpoint. Performance differences noted by Fox et al. were not statistically significant at levels of taxon-loss of 70 percent and greater, but for the small numbers of taxa left at this point, the index used to measure performance had also lost some of its resolution. We suspect that a larger study, with more histories, more lineage segments per history, or both, would reveal significant patterns, but this is an open question.
Smith's final charge (p. 765) is that ''if temporal data are involved in . . . select[ing] our phylogenetic hypothesis, then it becomes circular to use phylogenetic trees to investigate questions concerning rates of character evolution . . . .'' Circular reasoning is when an argument claims to demonstrate a relationship that was taken as one of its premises-treating the same statement as both evidence and conclusion (Hull, 1967; Sober, 1988, p. 221) . Stratocladistics uses data on temporal ordering of ''taxa''-units of analysis-to help select among hypotheses about genealogical history. We can then legitimately use best-fit genealogies to constrain rates of character change within ''taxa''-units of descentwithout ever having to return to the temporal ordering of units of analysis. Use of the word ''taxa'' at two different stages in the argument has conjured up for Smith the specter of circularity, but his charge does not hold up to Sober (1988) inspection.
In summary, we have given cladistics every advantage and yet stratocladistics comes out ahead. Smith describes this result as ''misleading''-an artifact of a contrived and unrealistic test. However, the criticisms raised by Smith are themselves driven by misunderstandings of what stratocladistics is doing and why. Smith's opinion that ''[a]dding stratigraphic data needlessly inflates the potential sources of error associated with phylogenetic reconstruction'' (Smith, 2000, p. 765) is not borne out by any facts of which we are aware. I N A brief commentary, broadly dismisses several newly developed phylogenetic methods that make use of temporal data. In this comment, I wish to concur with other critics of Smith (Fisher et al., 2002; Wagner, 2002) , and in particular expand on an argument of Fisher et al. regarding stratocladistics and the divisibility of paleontological time scales. Smith's strongest and most detailed argument is that ''With enough subdivisions of time . . . stratigraphic debt can be made sufficiently large to overturn any phylogeny based on morphology . . . '' As pointed out by Fisher et al. (2002) , actually employed a rather conservative algorithm for defining the number of time intervals. Here I argue that stratocladistics fundamentally depends on global temporal durations of fossil taxa, not just on their ranges across individual (or even composite) stratigraphic sections, and that these durations are intrinsically expressed in discrete, not continuous, units. Thus, paleontological time scales cannot be subdivided arbitrarily and are not literally ''stratigraphic.'' I also discuss additional objective criteria for limiting temporal subdivision, which show that a series of stratocladistic studies involving North American mammals actually have underdivided the time scale. Thus, stratocladistics does not allow for infinite temporal subdivision either in principle or in practice. TIME AND STRATIGRAPHY almost casually mentions that there always may be ''enough subdivision of time'' to create as much ''stratigraphic debt'' as one might want. Smith nowhere explains why. One might think so because the literature has used ''stratigraphy'' and ''time'' as virtual synonyms; local stratigraphic sections are measured in continuous units such as meters; and perhaps, then, time is mathematically continuous and infinitely divisible. Alternatively, in an illustration Fig. 1) shows subdivisions of ''absolute time,'' and numerical time scales also are necessarily discrete and fundamentally different from measured sections.
The terms ''time'' and ''stratigraphy'' .Almost all of the large literature on stratocladistics, and on related ''stratigraphic'' measures of the quality of the fossil record (e.g., Paul, 1982; Benton, 1994; Huelsenbeck, 1994; Wills, 1999) , has used the term ''stratigraphic'' to mean ''having to do with time.'' The very terms ''stratocladistics'' (Fisher, 1982 (Fisher, , 1991 and ''stratophenetics'' (Gingerich, 1976) are formed by using stratigraphy as a shorthand for temporal data. Indeed, flatly defined ''stratigraphic data'' as ''the temporal order of specimens in the fossil record.'' ''Stratigraphic'' also is overused as a synonym for ''temporal'' in the larger paleontological geological literature [e.g., the North American ''Stratigraphic'' Code (NACSN, 1983) ; the International ''Stratigraphic'' Guide of the International Subcommission on Stratigraphic Classification (Hedberg, 1976) ].
However, ''stratigraphy'' in a literal sense only has to do with the description and analysis of ''stratified rocks'' (Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, 1994), ''rock strata'' (Jackson, 1997) , or ''stratified (layered) rocks; the arrangement of strata'' (Woodburne, 1987) . Meanwhile, Hedberg (1976) uses ''chronostratigraphy'' to mean the study of ''the age of strata'' and as a subset of geochronology, not the other way around. Finally, Harland et al. (1990) refer to ''chronometric'' and ''chronostratic'' time scales, only tying the latter to stratigraphy. Numerical time scales of the kind used, for example, by Wills (1999) are clearly not ''chronostratic'' but ''chronometric.'' In sum, all responsible authors should agree that ''stratigraphy'' and ''stratigraphic'' concern rocks, not time, so the terms ''chronology'' and ''temporal'' should always be preferred in the phylogenetic literature.
Local vs. regional and global scales of stratocladistic analyses.Putting terminology aside, some stratocladistic studies do focus on a single, local stratigraphic section (e.g., Polly, 1997) . So it might be logically justified (if uncharitable) to argue that stratocladists might overdivide their time scales just by slicing up their sections too narrowly.
Of course, sections are not arbitrarily and infinitely divisible because the rock record accumulates at variable rates and omits variable amounts of time in between depositional packages. Furthermore, very small stratigraphic intervals would break up sedimentary packages that were laid down in single events. Regardless, most applications of ''stratigraphic'' methods in phylogenetics (e.g., Huelsenbeck, 1994; Wills, 1999; ) have relied upon continental or intercontinental paleontological time scales, which are not even simple agglomerations of stratigraphic sections: they are empirical hypotheses about the ordering of real-world biological events.
Quantitative biochronology and stratigraphy.One still could try to translate these discrete, broad-based time scales into continuous stratigraphic units by means of quantitative correlation methods. Indeed, a large body of literature on graphic correlation (Shaw, 1964) seeks to do just this. However, graphic correlation actually seeks to find best-fit hypothetical arrangements of discrete biological events, such as first and last appearance events (not ''appearance datums,'' which pertain only to individual, local stratigraphic sections: Alroy, , 1996 Walsh, 1998) . As stated by Shaw (1964, p. 104) , ''the only objective temporal facts that a fossil species can supply-the only epochs it can mark in the rocks-are the beginning and end of its range.'' More importantly, numerous rival methods do not generate continuous master stratigraphic sections (archaeological seriation- Burroughs and Brower, 1982; probabilistic biostratigraphy-Hay, 1972; Gradstein and Agterberg, 1982; unitary associations-Guex, 1977 unitary associations-Guex, , 1991 appearance event ordination-Alroy, 1992 appearance event ordination-Alroy, , 1994 . Their common currency is discrete appearance event sequences, which need not correspond perfectly to any one local stratigraphy (e.g., see Guex, 1991) , and typically are computable even from taxonomic inventories of fossil collections that have unknown stratigraphic interrelationships. Thus, objective, quantitative paleontological time scales are not simply stratigraphy writ large.
Admittedly, most of these methods are said to concern quantitative ''biostratigraphy,'' not time per se. However, ''biostratigraphy'' itself only has to do with vertical distributions of fossils in rocks per se, and with characterizations of strata on the basis of fossils (Jackson, 1997) . Thus, methods like unitary associations and appearance event ordination that are independent of superposition are not strictly ''biostratigraphic,'' and we need another term-i.e., biochronology-for the combination of biostratigraphic data and inventory data (Guex, 1991; Alroy, 1992 .
Global time scales and stratigraphy.Of course, most realworld paleontological time scales still are constructed using qualitative, non-statistical criteria. However, traditional criteria are themselves directly translatable into the currency of first and last appearances. All biostratigraphic time scales reduce to interval, assemblage, or abundance zones (NACSN, 1983) . Any interval or assemblage zone is defined by the combinations of overlapping ranges, which are just sets of appearance events. Abundance zones are not routinely used and have been rejected by most quantitative workers (e.g., Shaw, 1964; Guex, 1977; Gradstein and Agterberg, 1982; Alroy, 1992) . Some workers tie names of paleontological time intervals to ''reference localities'' (e.g., Mein, 1975; Alroy, 2000) , but the temporal correlations underpinning such time scales always can be expressed in terms of appearance events.
In summary, paleontological time scales always reduce to discrete historical events, so stratocladistics, related phylogenetic methods, and the so-called stratigraphic fit measures all have to work with event-based time scales whenever they stray from local stratigraphic sections. Algorithmically, these methods only make sense in the first place if they do at some level correspond with global biochronology-as recognized by and , who required that each of their ''stratigraphic'' intervals be bounded on each end by at least one event. Perhaps, then, stratocladistics is better called ''chronocladistics.'' CONSTRAINTS ON SUBDIVIDING TIME SCALES also has failed to indicate that numerous logical and quantitative criteria may be used to limit the subdivision of time scales, and that there are specific reasons to favor the level of precision actually used in stratocladistic analyses of the mammalian record.
Logical limits.Both quantitative methods and formal nomenclatural rules define time intervals directly on the basis of appearance events, and each taxon may have only one first and one last appearance. Thus, paleontological time scales never can break out more than twice as many intervals as taxa, and the maximum number of intervals is necessarily finite. Furthermore, each time interval must uniquely include at least one compositionally unique fossil collection. Otherwise, it would not be possible to tie at least one appearance event to the time interval.
Stratocladistics and all related methods are of course subject to these two constraints. Similarly, and counted intervals only if they included fossils pinning down appearances of ingroup taxa. Thus, intervals were required to sample fossiliferous horizons. Thanks to emphasizing only fossils of ingroup taxa, this criterion is even more conservative than the two mentioned here.
Limits based on diachrony.The divisibility of time scales is further limited by the precision of paleontological correlations. Some authors equate precision with the average diachrony of individual appearance events seen in multiple regions, a figure often given in studies of Cenozoic deep sea microfossils (e.g., SpencerCervato et al., 1994) . Importantly, the average interregional diachrony of North American mammalian species is 1.4 m.y. (Alroy, 1998a) .
Of course, if time intervals are actually based on appearances of a few taxa selected specifically because they exhibit low diachrony, then these general, average estimates will be too liberal, at least when it comes to interval boundaries. However, paleontologists routinely fail to identify low-diachrony taxa (Alroy, 1998a) . Thus, average diachronies do provide a rough estimate of the point at which further subdivision of a time scale would become reckless.
Limits based on calibration error.Researchers also have tried to estimate precision directly by calibrating paleontological time scales against independent geochronological age estimates, most famously including Harland et al. (1982 Harland et al. ( , 1990 . Quantitative analyses of fossil mammal biochronology provide numerous estimates (e.g., Alroy, 1992 Alroy, , 1996 Alroy, , 1998b Alroy, , 2000 for North America; Alroy, 1994, for Africa; Azanza et al., 1997, for Europe), and average 95 percent confidence intervals typically are as low as 1.4 m.y. (Alroy, 2000) .
Limits based on the precision/accuracy tradeoff.An even more direct approach (Alroy, 1996 (Alroy, , 1998b is to examine the tradeoff between precision and accuracy as time scales are subdivided by comparing observed appearances with ''true,'' fullyresolved appearance dates estimated by adding 50 percent confidence intervals (Paul, 1982; . The inferred optimal interval length for the North American mammalian time scale is about 0.7 m.y. (Alroy, 1996 (Alroy, , 1998b .
Stratocladistic precision in practice.The 0.7 m.y. precision figure is quite close to the average interval lengths actually used in key stratocladistic studies: subdivided the Tiffanian through early Bridgerian mammal ages into eight intervals averaging about 1.5 m.y. (see Alroy, 2000) ; Polly (1997) subdivided the Clarkforkian and Wasatchian into 10 intervals averaging 0.65 m.y.; and subdivided the Paleocene into eight intervals averaging 1.4 m.y. The one major stratocladistic study not involving mammals ) defined just 18 intervals for almost the entire Paleozoic.
In his brief comments on the subject, Smith (2000) made it appear that the entire problem of time scale resolution is subjective and arbitrary. His argument only could have resulted from a misreading of recent literature on both stratocladistics and quantitative biochronology: multiple objective criteria do exist, and they all suggest that , Polly (1997) , and used entirely conservative temporal schemes. S MITH (2000) CRITIQUED several recently proposed phylogenetic methods that accommodate stratigraphic data as well as several simulation studies that examine the efficacy of such methods. Here, I will evaluate Smith's claims concerning: 1) the putative ad hoc nature of some tests using stratigraphic data; and 2) the relevancy of simulation studies to empirical studies.
STRATIGRAPHIC TESTS OF HYPOTHESIZED DURATIONS
Ad hoc versus hypothetico-deductive tests.Wagner (1995) used confidence intervals on observed stratigraphic ranges Marshall, 1990) to test taxon durations hypothesized by a possible phylogeny. Smith (p. 764) dismissed this approach as ad hoc ''weighting'' of character and stratigraphic data. However, Wagner's use of confidence intervals is a hypothetico-deductive approach that assigns different roles to the two datasets. Morphology is used abductively (inferring a condition based on assumed properties of that condition; see Sober, 1988) to hypothesize that species X and Y are closest relatives among sampled taxa. If so, then: A) if one is ancestral, then the other's lineage diverged within the ancestor's duration; or B) if they are true sister taxa, then their lineages share a common divergence time. A and B both limit expected observable patterns in the fossil record. If stratigraphic data deviate from those expectations, then we reject the hypothesized durations and phylogeny. Smith (2001b) employed similar logic in a ''stratigraphically restricted'' phylogenetic analysis of echinoids, albeit without formalized rejection of possible relationships between old and (excluded) young taxa. This represents modus tollens deduction (i.e., dismissing an explanation because observation deviates from expectation). Why we even considered a hypothesis in the first place is irrelevant, except that we now cannot accept the premises that led to that hypothesis (see below). The germane point is that analyses formalizing expectations in a deductive statement are not ad hoc.
The complexities of stratigraphy and the soundness of tests.Although not ad hoc, hypothetico-deductive tests can be unsound (i.e., based on false premises). Smith implied (p. 765) that the complexity of the fossil record renders the premises of many pertinent tests unsound. For example, Smith (2001a) documented long-term changes in Cretaceous European sedimentation (and thus preservation) rates, with some environments from some intervals having no rock record at all. One might think that such variation necessarily exaggerates the significance of gaps across such intervals. One would be mistaken. Workers can and have employed taphonomic, environmental, and geographic controls (Bottjer and Jablonski, 1998; Alroy, personal commun. in Wagner, 1995; on probability tests and also accommodated variable preservation rates (Marshall, , 1997 Solow and Smith, 1997; Weiss and Marshall, 1999; Wagner, 2000c; Foote, 2001 ). If such steps are taken, then tests expect gaps when there is little pertinent fossil record. Tests also can expect longer (or shorter!) gaps if preservation rates change. In other words, gap-analyses need not assume homogeneous preservation rates or confuse absence of the fossil record with absence from the fossil record.
THE PERTINENCE OF SIMULATION STUDIES TO METHODOLOGY
The structure of real and simulated matrices.Sieving trees with confidence intervals fails to consider how strongly morphology supports an inference . As Smith noted (p. 764), this is because the inference criterion (shared derived characters) differs from the test criterion (probability). Wagner (1998) introduced a likelihood method that measured stratigraphic and morphologic evidence against hypotheses. This method used Monte Carlo simulations to determine the probability of parsimony trees of Y steps given X actual changes on a true phylogeny (which might or might not match a parsimony tree). Smith (p. 765) claimed that the simulated matrices had far less phylogenetic structure than did the original hyaenid matrix, stating ''. . . the tree length distributions that result [from simulations] are only weakly skewed suggesting that very little hierarchical signal resides in these data. . . .'' If true, then Wagner's test overestimated the likelihoods of long trees. It seems that Smith mistook likelihood curves (i.e., the probability of the shortest tree requiring Y steps given X true steps) for tree length skewness curves (i.e., the probability of a random tree requiring Y steps given one matrix) (see Huelsenbeck, 1991) . Misunderstandings aside, if Smith's claim is true, then the real hyaenid matrix should have more structure than typical simulated matrices. I repeated simulations for 18 sampled species and 19 independent characters with 26 states (matching the hyaenid data analyzed in the 1998 study). Structure for each is measured using compatibility (see ; see also Fig. 1 ). There are 84 compatible character pairs (CPs) in the hyaenid matrix. Simulations with fewer than 61 independent changes (the parsimony tree posits only 50) yield 84 or fewer CPs in less than 5 percent of simulations ( Fig. 1.1) . Thus, Wagner's study showed the failure of parsimony given matrices with more hierarchical signal than possessed by hyaenid characters.
Monte Carlo tests reject the hypothesis of Ͻ61 independent steps among hyaenids given matrix compatibility and rejects the hypothesis of 60ϩ steps given matrix congruence . In other words, we can reject all possible hypotheses of independent character change. Repeating the simulations with three characters correlated (i.e., tending to change together; see greatly increases the probability of 84 CPs given ''only'' 10 more steps than the parsimony tree ( Fig. 1.2) .
We cannot say that the correlated-change hypothesis is correct or what processes were responsible for the pattern. However, given proper application of Occam's Razor (i.e., designation of the null hypothesis, not a test criterion), it is the simplest known hypothesis that we cannot reject. Smith claims both that one can evaluate homoplasy only given a model tree (p. 763) and that approaches such as are used here are ''foolhardy'' (p. 765). However, these tests use methods widely accepted by biometricians to derive expectations for hypotheses without a ''known'' tree (see also Martins, 1996; O'Keefe and Wagner, 2001) . Moreover, the rejected hypothesis (independent character change) is an assumption when equating parsimony trees with phylogenies. Correlated change greatly reduces the success of parsimony  FIGURE 1-Probability of 84 compatible character pairs (CPs) among 18 taxa and 19 characters, with characters modeled on hyaenids (from Werdelin and Solounias, 1991) . Compatible pairs are two characters that do not indicate necessary homoplasy (Le Quesne, 1969 ; for example, two binary characters are compatible if all taxa code 00, 01, 11, but incompatible if all four combinations exist. Maximum matrix structure for 19 characters is 171 CPs. Distributions reflect only simulations that yielded as many character states (26) as observed among hyaenids. Simulations allowed only one step per character per branch. 1, 56 steps among independent characters. Although claims predict that hyaenid compatibility should be on the right side of the distributions, only 1.7 percent of such matrices have 84 or fewer compatibilities; 2, 60 steps among 16 independent characters and three correlated characters. Now 48 percent of matrices have 84 or fewer compatibilities. In general, the observed CPs become more probable given hypotheses of more change and/or more complicated character evolution.
FIGURE 2-Actual rates of character change used in simulations and rates of character change implied by parsimony analyses of those simulated matrices. Simulations described in Figure 1 . Each character evolves independently, with simulations permitting the same number of states as the corresponding hyaenid character. Each point is an average from over 1,000 simulations. 1, As the actual length increases, the difference between the minimum length and the actual length increases (note that the ordinate omits multiple changes on a single sampled branch, which parsimony cannot infer); 2, parsimony distorts the rate of change per branch even further by positing more unsampled ancestors than present in the true phylogeny. The solid horizontal line shows the per branch rate of change for hyaenid characters. Thus, the parsimony rate of 0.091 changes per character per branch (as seen on the hyaenid parsimony tree) typically require actual rates of 0.121 changes per character branch. Huelsenbeck and Nielsen, 1999) and McCracken et al. (1999) suggest that correlated change is a major reason for the misidentification of homoplasies as synapomorphies (and homologies as parallelisms) by parsimony. Obviously, methods (simulation or otherwise) that can infer correlated change without a model phylogeny are important.
Monte Carlo apples and parsimony oranges.Smith (p. 765) noted the highest rates used in some simulations exceeded the per branch rates of change implied by parsimony trees for a real taxa (Wagner, 2000a, fig. 3 ). Smith (p. 765) considered this evidence that simulations by and used unrealistically high rates of character evolution. Parsimony trees give us a minimum possible rate (MPR) of change. When MPRs for simulated matrices equal the MPRs of hyaenids, the parsimony trees underestimate change (Fig. 2.1) and, inflate unsampled ancestors. Thus, MPRs divide too few changes over too many branches ( Fig. 2.2) . Arguing that the real world deviates from this generalization is simply special pleading.
What simulations tell us about the ''test'' of congruence.One must assume that ''all homologies will be congruent (synapomorphies)'' is a universal property of homologies for character congruence to test phylogenetic hypothesis validity. However, empirical demonstrations of very different parsimony trees for the same taxa given different data sets (e.g., McCracken et al., 1999; Wiens and Hollingsworth, 2000) show that many homologies in at least one data set are not synapomorphies within that character set. Unfortunately, empirical cases cannot easily test reasons why the premise is false (largely because the true trees are unknown) and thus do not tell us how concerned we should be about fossil taxa with single character sets.
Simulations show that the ''all homologies are synapomorphies'' is unsound simply due to chance homoplasy when minimum rates of change match those of real data. Simulation studies also show that ''all homologies are synapomorphies'' is less sound under complicated character evolution such as rate heterogeneity (Kuhner and Felsenstein, 1994) or correlated character change (Huelsenbeck and Nielsen, 1999) . Although simulated character evolution is much less complicated than biological character evolution is (Smith, 1994, p. 67) , suggesting that real ''complications'' represent an exception to the rules amounts to special pleading. Finally, simulations show that adding characters does not make the premise completely sound even when using hundreds more characters than available to paleontologists (Graybeal, 1998) .
Therefore, Smith's (p. 765) conclusion that simulations pertain ''only with respect to the specific set of assumptions on which the model was constructed'' is opposite of their true lessons. Simulations show that homology (and phylogeny) affect but do not determine congruence and thus that incongruence cannot demonstrate non-homology. In other words, there is no ''test of congruence.'' Given this, it is foolhardy for workers to continue to use such a ''test'' without at least demonstrating that parsimony frequently succeeds on simulated matrices with similar matrix structure to a real character matrix. If not, then other methods (possibly one of those using stratigraphy) must be used. Ultimately, workers must face the possibility that few data sets meet the ''specific set of assumptions'' (Smith: p. 763) required for cladistics to reconstruct phylogeny. SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS These issues might be irrelevant if, as Smith (p. 765) suggested, simulation studies used rates of homoplasy higher than those seen in most taxa. Unfortunately, they do not (e.g., Wagner, 2000a Wagner, , 2000b . One solution stems from a question: why are we interested in phylogeny? Phylogenies have important evolutionary implications (Smith, 1988 (Smith, , 1994 and evolutionary biologists often are interested in these implications, not in the relationships among hyaenids, gastropods, echinoids, etc., themselves. Consider rates of change (e.g., Smith, et al., 1992) or correlated character change (Pagel, 1994) . One can calculate the likelihood of hypothesized character evolution and hypothesized relationships given morphologic data (Wagner, 2000d; Lewis, 2001) . We then can determine whether the most-likely one-rate (or independent change) tree is significantly worse than the most-likely two-rate (or correlated change) tree (see Goldman, 1993) . Alternatively, one can accommodate phylogenetic uncertainty by ''integrating'' over numerous possible phylogenies when testing macroevolutionary hypotheses (e.g., Huelsenbeck et al., 2000) or over numerous character ''models'' when testing phylogenetic hypotheses (e.g., Larget and Simon, 1999) . In either case, phylogenies also have likelihoods given stratigraphy (Huelsenbeck and Rannala, 1997; Wagner, , 2000c , which are independent of any assumptions about character change. Thus, contrary to Smith's gloomy portrayal, the stratigraphic distributions of species are important data for treebased tests of macroevolutionary hypotheses. I TOO WELCOME this informed debate on the subject of the place of stratigraphy in phylogenetic reconstruction. Fisher et al. and Wagner have had the opportunity to clarify and expand on their respective approaches while Alroy chides me for not understanding the realities of correlation. The key areas of disagreement lie in how much reliance we think can be put on modeling evolution and to what extent we can prejudge the quality of the fossil record.
Alroy emphasises that there is a practical limit on the resolution achievable from relative and absolute time scales. In the example he cites, a realistic lower bound is reached when time intervals are of about 0.7 Ma duration. In other situations different levels of resolution may be possible that are independent of taxonomic data. For example, our recent work (Gale et al., 2000) uses chalkmarl couplets that are thought to reflect Milankovitch cyclicity to define 20,000 yr time intervals. These units are correlatable over at least 100 km largely independent of biostratigraphic information. So limits on resolution imposed by technical difficulties of correlation are hardly objective, though they represent real thresholds/barriers. There is, however, an upper bound, reached when all occurrences are treated as falling within a single time interval, which is objective. Working at the upper bound corresponds to ignoring stratigraphic data in phylogeny reconstruction, while anything less than the upper bound uses stratigraphic information. What those wanting to use stratocladistics fail to clarify is why analyses should be carried out at, or close to, the finest scale of precision achievable. If the fossil record is both seriously incomplete and heterogeneous in terms of the environments that are preserved and rock outcrop area, as I (Smith, 2001 ) and others (e.g., Jackson and Johnson, 2001) think it is, then working with high precision could be very misleading. Why work with units of 0.7 Ma rather than 7, 70 or even 700 Ma?
Sifting optimal and suboptimal phylogenetic hypotheses, or adopting a stratolikelihood approach requires some prejudgement about the quality of the fossil record, and these methods are sensitive to how accurate that judgement turns out to be. Wagner is quite right to say that more realistic approaches to calculating confidence intervals are now possible (e.g., Marshall, 1998) . But in practice such methods present a formidable challenge, and plugging in realistic estimates of sampling and preservational bias are only likely to increase the length of error bars (e.g., see Bleweisse, 1998 vs. Marshall, 1999 and Smith and Peterson, 2002 . , for example, corrected confidence interval estimates to take account of surface outcrop area at the localities they were sampling, but that removes just one of many potential taphonomic and sampling problems. In their study the disappearance of Maastrichtian ammonites from the local section also coincides with the disappearance of other molluscs and echinoids known to continue into the Danian in sections elsewhere (Smith et al., 1999) , so there must be some preservational bias or diversity change as yet unaccounted for. Certainly absence from the fossil record should not be confused with absence of a fossil record, but so far studies do little more than treat sampled rock record as equivalent to the ''complete'' record. is to be commended for using a ''control group'' (outgroup gastropods) to indicate whether conditions favouring aragonitic preservation are to be found in each selected time interval. But again this is just a first step in trying to correct for preservational biases. For example, it does not account for variable representation of facies and environments over time, such as those documented by Adrain and Westrop (2002) , which could easily influence the chances of ''capturing'' individual species.
Similarly FreqRat estimates of preservation are sensitive to taxonomic practice (Foote and Raup, 1996, p. 136) and overestimate completeness in the face of large gaps and a heterogeneous fossil record (Foote, 1997, p. 295) . It may take just one find anywhere to register a taxon as present (Fisher et al., this volume) , but it also just takes one taxonomist to use a gap as a convenient place for applying a change in taxonomic name for that gap to be missed and for FreqRat to overestimate completeness. The distribution of the three species of the coelacanth Macropoma in the Cenomanian-Turonian of Europe makes it appear to have an excellent fossil record at zone level. Yet there is a 100 Ma gap to the Recent Latimeria and a 40 Ma gap separating Macropoma and Latimeria from its sister group in the Portlandian (Forey, 1998) . So local completeness in no way corresponds to true completeness. Traditional taxonomies at generic level are likely to be riddled with this problem. I remain sceptical that much can be deduced about the quality of the fossil record without phylogenetic information, other than on a local scale.
Wagner stresses the importance of modeling for understanding empirical studies. Testing the acuracy of methods that are used to reconstruct evolutionary relationships is of course important but simulation is only one tool available. In the only known system where evolution has actually been observed, namely in the molecular evolution of laboratory-cultured bacterial strains over time, parsimony and other tree-building techniques perform well in deciphering true relationships (Hillis et al., 1992) . Additionally, tests of phylogenetic reconstruction methodologies that utilize ''well-supported'' phylogenies founded on empirical data (e.g., Allard and Miyamoto, 1992) have likewise found parsimony to work well.
Models certainly have a role, and it is important to stress that this is not an argument about parsimony versus maximum likelihood in character analysis. For molecular data, where the kinetics of base substitution are understood and a probability matrix of character state change can be realistically constructed, maximum likelihood is a powerful tool (Whelan et al., 2001) . Indeed maximum likelihood methods under simulation do generally outperform parsimony at finding the correct tree, so long as sequences can be assumed to be under little selection. When deriving phylogenetic relationships using maximum likelihood, tree topology and branch length are variables that are assessed against empirical data and a model of character transformation probabilities. But what Wagner does has little in common to the molecular phylogeneticist's approach since morphological character transition probabilities cannot be established a priori. Instead Wagner uses estimates of two unknowns (how ''wrong'' the minimum steps tree is based on model simulations and how complete the fossil record is) to derive probabilities.
Towards the end Wagner broadens the debate far beyond the use of stratigraphy to question the very basis of comparative anatomy. He makes the bold claim that simulation studies can demonstrate that the notion that ''all homologies are synapomorphies'' is unsound. This concept of homology occupies a central position in comparative biology and the case for equating homology with synapomorphy has a strong theoretical foundation (see Patterson, 1982 and Pinna, 1991) . All homologies must be synapomorphies, otherwise they fail their most basic criterion. However, the reverse is not true-all synapomorphies do not necessarily have to be homologies. I suspect that Wagner has simply confused ''homology equals synapomorphy'' with ''synapomorphy equals homology.'' Different data sets often point to somewhat different topologies, as Wagner points out. This is well known, and there are a number of tests that can be applied to show whether the data sets conflict significantly or differ because of limited data (e.g., Farris et al., 1994; Larson, 1994) . Synapomorphies are thus putative statements of homology to be tested as more information comes available. At best what Wagner can claim to have demonstrated from simulations is that ''all synapomorphies are not proven homologies at the specified level,'' something that all phylogeneticists accept as a matter of course. There is no truth, and the only test of whether character homologies have been correctly posited is the test of congruence-how well each individual character hypothesis is corroborated by other hypotheses of character homology. For Wagner the best supported tree on such empirical evidence is not necessarily the true tree. Maybe he is correct, but the best supported tree is, never the less, the tree that summarizes our current observations of pertinent real-world data most effectively. If we abandon this in favor of a product of theoretical modeling and irrelevant temporal data then we are surely lost.
So, at the heart of this debate is a fundamental disagreement about the role of empiricism. For me the only information we have to determine relationship comes from the character data we can extract from organisms. It is this evidence and this evidence alone that allows us to posit kinship amongst taxa, irrespective of stratigraphy. Only after this initial hypothesis has been constructed can we move on to explore the implications in terms of how such a pattern has arisen.
The other camp claims that a parsimonious interpretation of empirical data is misleading in as much as it does not match the results from particular theoretical modeling. An assumption about ''the truth'' and how evolution has proceded is thus used to reject the baseline set by empirical evidence on which our notions of homology and the very existence of evolution are founded. Note that parsimony is not being invoked as the modus operandus of evolution, but is used simply as the most basic yardstick against which rival hypotheses are judged-one that makes minimal assumptions about how such a pattern has arisen.
Wagner points the way forward with some possible solutions but omits the obvious. A phylogenetic hypothesis is only as good as the characters that are included. Any analysis of a poor data matrix, whether by parsimony or maximum likelihood, will generate a poor tree. So there is a serious need for palaeontologists to devote more time and attention to actual specimens and the collection and refinement of primary data. compilation of gastropod characters, for example, was a major achievement, but there is still plenty of scope for improvement. Many data sets remain replete with arbitrary divisions of continuous variables and trivial shell ornament characters that are shunned by the majority of neontological taxonomists. For me the bottom line is that the groupings we as taxonomists end up with must eventually be justified on the observed distribution of biologically sound characters rather than probability statements based on arbitrary phenetic data and questionable assumptions.
Finally it may fail the technical definition of circularity (stratocladistics does not complete the circle by reconstructing taxon order in the rock record from the derived trees), but using stratigraphic data both as part of the selection criterion and for subsequent calibration of the tree compromises the independence of stratigraphic data. Stratigraphic data is important and makes paleobiology special, but we should use it properly, for calibration, and leave homology statements as the arbiter of relationships.
